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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to test the relationship between wage and workers’ labor 
effort for the Brazilian construction industry. This relationship is stated by both the shirking 
and the labor discipline versions of efficiency wage models. Actually workers’ labor effort 
is neither verifiable nor available for empirical tests, so the most of the empirical tests for 
this theory are performed by testing the trade-off between wages and supervision, and the 
trade-off between wages and the workers’ probability of termination. This paper provides 
empirical  tests  for  both  relationships,  and  the  efficiency  wage  model  hypothesis  is 
empirically supported by this paper.  
Keywords:  Efficiency  Wage  Models,  Cross-sectional  Models,  Panel  Data  Models, 
Matched Employer-Employee Data. 
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The efficiency wage hypothesis argues that wages, at least in some markets, are determined 
by more than simply supply and demand. Specifically, it points to the incentive for firms to 
pay  their  employees  more  than  the  market-clearing  wage  in  order  to  increase  their 
productivity or efficiency. There are different versions of efficiency wages models, but in 
this paper I am mainly interested in the shirking version of efficiency wage model. This 
version  states  that  higher  wages  are  paid  by  firms  in  order  to  extract  higher  levels  of 
intensity from workers. 
 
The most important theoretical papers on the shirking version of efficiency wages were 
developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Bowles (1985) and, Bulow and Summers (1986). 
A  common  characteristic  of  these  papers  is  to  formalize  the  relationship  between 
employers and employees as a agency problem. It is well known that the principal-agent 
problem  arises  under  conditions  of  incomplete  and  asymmetric  information  when  a 
principal hires an agent. 
 
In  the  shirking  model  the  principal-agent  problem  arises  because  of  the  employers´ 
impossibility to obtain complete information about the effort level workers´ decision. On 
the other hand, the firm product level is known by the both parts. This impossibility is 
justified by the employers´ imperfect monitoring of workers´ labor effort, and the high 
costs that this supervision task requires.  
 
In this way, it is impossible to design a  contract of selling and buying of labor effort 
intensity. So, the alternative option is to design a incomplete contract of employment which 
hours and wages are bargained, but the intensity of labor effort to be performed by workers 
are not considered in their clauses. 
 
Given the incompleteness of the employment contracts, and the role of workers´ effort 
intensity in the production function, and performance firms, it becomes necessary to the employers to control and to supervise workers in order to extract higher levels of labor 
effort of them.  
 
The shirking version of efficiency wage model states that employers manipulate incentives 
and penalties (carrots and sticks) in order to persuate workers to work hard which wages 
premiuns  works  as  incentives,  and  dismissals  (or  probability  of  employment  contract 
termination) works as penalties 
 
In this paper are presented two different versions of shirking models. The first one was 
developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) which the well known non shirking condition is 
derived.  The  second  one  was  developed  by  Bowles  (2004)  which  a  probability  of 
termination equation for workers is derived in fuction of the wage rate. 
 
Empirical evidence for both theoretical models are given by using cross section and panel 
data  econometric  estimations,  and  the  outcomes  provided  in  this  paper  support  the 
efficiency wage hyphotesis. 
 
This paper is composed in the following way: (i) the first section presents the theoretical 
models to be tested; (ii) the second section presents the data, descriptive statistics, and the 
outcomes  of  the  econometric  analysis;  and  (iii)  the  third  and  last  section  presents  the 
conclusion. 
 1.  Theoretical Issues 
 
1.1. The Shirking Model 
 
The model assumes a fixed quantity of similar workers with a utility fuction U=(w-e), 
where w means the wage rate, and e means the labor effort. The labor effort workers´ 
choice is restricted in two values: e=0 (shirker), and e>0 (non-shirker).  
 
Workers who labor effort is e>0 will always be employed at wage rate w. On the other 
hand, workers who labor effort is e=0 are exposed to be caught shirking, and to be fired at 
probability q in each period of time. Unemployed workers receive a income (insurance) b. 
 
A shirker worker alternates between periods of employability and unemployment where θ 
is the fraction of time which these workers remain employed. The utility function for non-
shirker and shirker workers is, respectively: 
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In order to extract positive levels of labor effort from their workers, firms choose a wage 
rate w which U
N>U
S (the non shirking condition):  
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Given that q is the probability of a shirker worker to be caught and fired in each period of 
time, the expected time of employment for this worker will be 1/q. If ρ is the probability of 
an  unemployed  worker  to  find  a  job  in  each  period  of  time,  so  the  expected  time  of 
unemployment for this worker will be 1/ ρ.  
 Given these conditions, it is possible to write θ in the following way: 
 











By substituting the equation (4) in (3), we have: 
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It is possible to note a positive correlation between the labor effort (e) and the wage rate 
(w) in the equation (5), but an empirical test of this equation is not possible since that the 
labor effort is not a verifiable variable. 
 
On the other hand, it is possible to verify a trade-off between the wage rate (w) and the 
probability of shirker worker be caught and fired (q). If q is positively related with the firm 
intensity of monitoring, so it is possible to infer about a trade-off between wage rate and 
supervision intensity too. 
 
Empirical  tests  of  the  shirking  model  use  the  trade-off  between  wage  rate-intensity  of 
supervision as hypothesis. The main problem of these empirical tests is the choice of proxy 
variable for intensity of supervision. The empirical works on this subject uses two different 
proxy variables: (1) the size of the firm; and (2) the supervisors/staff ratio (span of control). 
 
In  this  paper  I  use  the  supervisors/staff  ratio  (span  of  control)  as  proxy  variable  for 





 1.2. The Labor Discipline Model 
 
The labor discipline model is developed in Bowles (1985, and 2004). In this model is 
assumed that the employer know the best-effort response of workers, e(w,m,z), given the 
wage rate, w, the level of monitoring, m, and the exogenous fallback option, z. 
 
In the beginning of each time period the employer select and announces: (a) a probability 
of termination, t(e,m) є[0,1] com te<0 e tm>0; (b) a wage rate, w; and (c) a monitoring level 
for each hour of labor hired, m.  
 
The worker utility function in each period of time is u=u(w,e) with uw≥0 e ue≤0. The 
worker varies e in order to maximize the present value of his expected utility, given his 
time preference rate, i. The present value of the expected utility can be written in the 
following way: 
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The worker will select an effort level, e, which ve=0, it implies that: 
 
( ) (8)       z v t u e e − =  
 
Supposing that the worker utility function has the following specification: 
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Where a is a positive constant. Suppose that the firm does not incur in costs to monitor 
workers
1. This simplification allows specifying the probability of termination function in 
the following terms:  
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Supposing that i and z are zero, these simplifications allow re-writing the equation (7) in 
















= =  
 
Let us remember that workers will select an effort level  e which ve=0 and ue=te(v-z). From 
equation (10) is known that te=-1, so the effort level which maximizes the expected utility 
function of workers will be: 
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It is possible to verify in the equation (12) that firms can not extract positive levels of effort 






                                                 
1 Bowles disagrees with the argument that incomplete information arises because the costs and imperfect 
monitoring. The author  suggests that "Incomplete information occurs when some information relevant at the 
outset  of  interaction  is  not  revealed  to  at  least  one  party.  It  is  sometimes  suggested  that  asymmetric 
information is  the  source of contractual incompleteness.  But this is  not quite right.  What counts  for the 
feasibility of a complete and third-party-enforceable contract is not only whether the relevant information is 
known, but also whether information is verifiable, that is admissible in a court of law or some other body that 
is capable of enforcing its terms". Substituting the outcome of the equation (12) in to the probability of termination function 
(equation 10), we have: 
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This outcome states a trade-off between the probability of termination and wages, which t 
will tend to 1 if the firm pay a wage rate equals 1+a, and t will tend to 0 if the firm pays a 
infinite  wage  rate.  This  hypothesis  –  the  trade-off  between  wages  and  probability  of 
termination – will be empirically tested in the following sections of this work.  
 




The data set used in this paper is RAIS which one uses to cover the period 2003 and 2004. 
RAIS  (Annual  Social  Information  Report)  is  an  annual  census  of  all  firms  and  their 
employees in Brazil. There is detailed information about each  employee (wages, hours 
worked, education, age, tenure, gender, and occupation) and each firm (industry, region, 
size,  establishment  type,  etc),  including  a  unique  identifier  for  each  firm  and  each 
establishment.  
 
This  sample  uses  individual  information  about  637,527  workers  in  2003,  and  635,121 
workers in 2004. Individual information is also available for employers – 12,329 firms in 
2003, and 12,082 firms in 2004. This sample corresponds to the total formal labor force 
employed in the construction industry located in the cities of Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, 
Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador e São Paulo. 
 
The choice of construction sector analysis is justified for three reasons: (1) the sector has 
specific statistics of unemployment for each city of the sample; (2) when compared with 
other  industrial  sectors,  this  sector  presents  higher  incidence  of  workers  fired  by  fair reason;  (3)  different  from  other  industrial  sectors,  the  intensity  of  supervision  in  the 
construction industry is exclusively performed by human work, so it is possible to infer that 
the span of control is a more realistic proxy for intensity of monitoring in this case.  
 
Descriptive statistics of variables used in this paper are reported in the table 1. Statistics are 
presented for each year of the sample, separately.    
 
 
2.2. Econometric Tests for the Shirking Model 
 
In  this  section  the  shirking  model  version  of  efficiency  wage  is  tested  by  different 
econometric estimators. In this specific test one only uses information about blue collar 
workers.  Given  the  occupational  code  for  each  worker,  it  is  possible  to  calculate  an 
accurate measure of span of control for each firm of the sample.  
 
The first step is to test the model through cross section analysis. The specification of the 
econometric model to be tested is: 
 
i i i i i S Z X w ε β β β β + + + + = 3 2 1 0 ln  (14) 
    
Where lnwi is the ln of worker i hourly wage, Xi is a vector of worker i attributes, Zi is a 
vector of variables related to the firm  where the worker i is employed, Si is the ratio 
supervisors/staff (span of control) in the firm where the worker i is employed, β´s are 
parameters to be estimated, and εi is an error.   
 
It was mentioned in the previous sections that shirking model states a negative relationship 
between wages and monitoring – in terms of the equation (14), it implies a negative value 
for the parameter β3.    
 
In order to test this hypothesis, one ran an OLS regression for each period available in the 
sample. The outcomes are reported in the table 2. In the second column of the table 2 it is possible to find the parameter β3 estimated for the 2003, and in the third column the value 
of β3 estimated for the 2004. In the both cases the estimated value of β3 present negative 
values - -0.0025 for 2003, and -0.00015 for 2004 -, but parameter of β3 for the 2004 is not 
statiscally significant. 
 
Given the availability of identifier for each firm, an alternative way to test the shirking 
model is by exploring the panel characteristics of the sample. The specification of the 
econometric model to be in the panel approach is: 
 
it i i it it it u S Z X w ε β β β β + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 ln  (15) 
 
Where ui is a disturbance that does not varies across the time. There are two hypotheses for 
relationship between ui and the other regressors of the equation (15): they are correlated 
(fixed effect models) or not (random effect models).  
 
The outcomes of these tests are reported in the table 2. Outcomes for random effect model 
are reported in forth column, and outcomes for the fixed effect model are reported in the 
fifth one. In the both cases the estimated value of β3 presents negative values - -0.0050 for 
random effects model, and -0.0055 for fixed effects model. 
 
In general, the outcomes presented in this section have corroborated the efficiency wage 
model hypothesis, but it is important to mention some limitations of this section: (1) it is 
expected that wages and supervision are simultaneously determined, so the estimations 
obtained  here  may  be  biased,  and  the  instrumental  variables  estimations  would  be 
necessary; (2) the panel has only two years; (3) fixed effects estimation is performed only 
for firms – it would be interesting obtain identifiers for workers in order to control the 




 2.3. Econometric Tests for the Labor Discipline Model 
 
In this section the labor discipline model version of efficiency wage is tested by different 
econometric  estimators.  Different  from  the  last  section,  in  this  specific  test  one  uses 
information about blue and white collar workers.  
 
Similar to the last section, the first step is to test the model through cross section analysis. 
The specification of the econometric model to be tested is: 
 
i i i i i U Z X w y ε β β β β β + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 ln  (16) 
 
Where yi is a dummy variable (yi=1 if the worker was fired by fair reason, otherwise yi=0),   
lnwi is the ln of worker i hourly wage, Xi is a vector of worker i attributes, Zi is a vector of 
variables  related  to  the  firm  where  the  worker  i  is  employed,  Ui  is  the  rate  of 
unemployment  in  the  city  where  the  worker  i  is  employed,  β´s  are  parameters  to  be 
estimated, and εi is an error.   
 
An important point to mention is about the expect values for the coefficients β1 and β4. The 
negative relationship between probability of termination and wages has just been discussed 
in  the  previous  sections.  The  relationship  between  probability  of  termination  and 
unemployment  depends,  as  argued  by  Campbell  (1997),  from  the  nature  of  the  labor 
contract termination.  
 
Different from that cases which terminations were caused by layoffs (in this case it is 
expected a positive  relationship between termination and unemployment), the expected 
relationship between fair reason terminations and unemployment rate is negative, since that 
it is expected that higher unemployment rates reduces the incentives for shirking – it means 
that unemployment rate is a discipline device on the labor force.   
 The model specified by the equation (16) was estimated by three different methods: (1) 
Logit, (2) Probit, and (3) OLS-Linear Probability Model. The outcomes obtained by Probit 
estimations are reported in the table 3. The second (third) column reports 2003 (2004) 
outcomes.    
 
The cross sectional outcomes corroborates the theoretical arguments which β1 and β4 are 
negatives. In the case of β1 the outcomes are -0.1427 for 2003, and -0.0426 for 2004. In the 
case of β4 the outcomes are -2.2474 for 2003, and -3.7974 for 2004. 
 
Alike  the  econometric  tests  of  the  shirking  model,  the  cross  section  outcomes  have 
supported the efficiency wage theory too. 
 
Following the econometric strategy from the previous section, the next step of this work is 
to explore the panel characteristics of the sample by using fixed effects estimators. The last 
test is to obtain parameters for β1 and β4 by using conditional logistic for fixed effects 
model. 
 
The results from the fixed effects conditional logistic model are reported in the last column 
of table 3. After controlling for the heterogeneity of firms, the outcomes remain supporting 
the trade-off between probability of termination and wages (-0.3448), but the negative 
relationship between probability of termination and unemployment rate is not supported by 
the estimated value for β4 (4.2494). Although the value of β4 is positive, it is not statiscally 
significant. 
 
The  outcomes  presented  in  this  section  have  corroborated  the  efficiency  wage  model 
hypothesis again, but it is important to mention that these outcomes suffer from the same 
limitations  discussed  before  (endogeneity,  and  workers  omitted  variables).  So,  it  is 
important to the reader take to account these problems and to interpret the outcomes with 
some caution. 
  Final Comments 
 
The aim of this paper was to test the shirking, and the labor discipline versions of the 
efficiency wage model.  A rich data set with detailed information about workers and firms 
from Brazilian construction industry was used in this way. 
 
Specificities  of  the  sample  allow  me  to  use  different  econometric  methods  to  test  the 
theoretical models presented along of this work. The econometric results supported the 
efficiency wage hypotheses in all used specifications (cross section, and panel analysis). 
 
It  was  commented  along  this  paper  about  the  limitations  of  the  tests.  Controls  for 
endogeneity, and for unobservable heterogeneity of workers would be very important to 
provide more robustness for the results – they are the next steps of this preliminary work. 
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Wage (in minimun wages) 
  
2.96  2.93  
































Number of workers 
 
637,527  635,121 
Number of Firms 
 
12,329  12,082 
 Table 2. Regressions Shirking Model 

























  -4.7356 
(-478.74) 









































  -0.0055 
(-7.35) 
Controls occupations.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls industries.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls local.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  352,017  357,348  709,365  709,365 
R
2  0.3478  0.3450     
F-Statistic  11,042.32  11,072.40     
Nr. Groups      10,378  10,378 Table 3. Regressions Labor Discipline Model 
Dependent variable: Fired worker fair reason=1; Otherwise=0 
Independent 
Variables 
Probit 2003 Model 
coefficient 
(z) 





















































Controls ocuppations.  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls industries.  Yes  Yes   
Observations  601,072  598,143  1,199.215 
Wald Chi  444.98  703.74  260.29 
Log pseudolikelihood  -11,047.66  -10,961.30  -14,393.12 
Hausman      37.97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 